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Abstract
We present a theoretical framework and supporting empirical evidence for the choice of acquisition
method in takeovers. In our model, bidders have a preference for speedy execution in order to minimize
competition for the target. Due to existing regulations, tender offers provide substantially lower
completion times than mergers and, as a result, are the acquisition method of choice. However, a tender
offer signals to the target good market opportunities for its shares which raises its reservation price. In
equilibrium, bidders trade-off speed and costs: tenders are faster but have higher premiums. We show that
deals in more competitive environments and deals with lesser external impediments on execution are
more likely to be structured as tender offers. Furthermore, the rivals of the bidding firm exhibit
significantly lower announcement returns in tender offers than in mergers.

JEL classification: G34, J50
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions, tender offers

“Still, little is known about why we sometimes observe takeover by … tender offer and
sometimes by merger.” – Harris and Raviv (1988)

1. Introduction
In the United States, there are essentially two ways to acquire the cash flow rights to a publicly
traded firm, either through a merger or through a tender offer.1 In a merger, the acquirer and the
target’s board of directors agree on a price, and then the target’s shareholders vote to approve the
deal. In a tender offer, the acquirer proposes a per-share price to the target’s shareholders, and
then the shareholders have the choice to sell their shares at the offer price or keep them. Harris
and Raviv were perplexed about how acquirers choose between these two acquisitions methods.
Twenty five years later, there is still no well-established theory about the choice of takeover
method.
In the interim, the nature of tender offers changed. Historically, a tender offer was a
hostile takeover device, used to bypass an unwilling board of directors. The introduction of the
Best Price Rule in the late 1980s by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made
tender offers fairer, assuring that blockholders could not be bought out for a higher price than
other investors.2 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show that the adoption of state antitakeover
laws in the late 1980s and early 1990s almost eradicated hostile tender offers completely.
Revisions to the Best Price Rule in 2006 opened the market for friendly tender offers like never
before. Our data shows that tenders are now as friendly as mergers. Despite the end of hostility,
tender offers are still a common acquisition method.

1

A tender offer in which the acquirer offers shares of its stock as part or complete consideration in the deal is legally
known as an exchange offer, but follows very similar rules to a tender offer. For our purposes, we lump tender
offers and exchange offers into one unless we explicitly state otherwise.
2
The Best Price Rule is also known as SEC Rule 14d-10.
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In this paper, we propose a new theory for the choice of acquisition method which is
generally supported by the data. The key difference between mergers and tender offer is in the
completion speed. The regulations are designed to allow for faster completion of tender offers
than mergers. Given that tender offers are quicker to complete, the speed must come at cost,
otherwise all deals would be tenders. In our theory, acquirers trade-off speed and cost: tenders
are faster, but come with a higher premium.
The first half of the paper develops a simple model which elaborates on the tradeoff
outlined above. Our model predicts that an acquirer will prefer a tender offer as the acquisition
method when there is high expected competition for the target, and may use a tender when there
is no competition if the costs of waiting are sufficiently high. We also show that takeover premia
will be higher in tender offers than in mergers.
In the second half of the paper, we present empirical evidence consistent with our
theoretical predictions based on a unique dataset with hand-collected data on acquisitions
announced between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.3 We show that the completion time
of tender offers is from 35 to 65 days shorter than the completion time of mergers conditional on
the model used. Next, we find that the probability for a bidder to structure the deal as a tender
offer increases with measures of the competitiveness of the takeover market. In particular, a
bidder is more likely to pursue the target via tender offer if there is an outstanding bid for the
target from another firm. Bidders are also more likely to choose a tender when they have some
prior relationship with the target because, in this case, losing the target to a competitor would be
more costly. Next, we find that target-initiated deals are less likely to be structured as tender

3

We focus on the post-2006 period since the revision of the Best Price Rule in 2006 relaxed significantly some of
the regulatory constraints on tender offers (see Section 5).
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offers. Finally, we show that the announcement returns of the bidder rivals are negative and
significantly lower for tender offers than for mergers.
We also find that bidders are less likely to pursue a tender offer when the legal and
financial costs of the tender are higher. Acquisition attempts that experience additional scrutiny
from governmental agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) take 114 days longer to complete. Such deals are rarely structured as tender
offers. Given that the level of government scrutiny is relatively easy to predict, our theory
suggests that a rational bidder would avoid incurring the extra costs of tender offers without
getting the execution benefits. Next, we find that tender offers are less likely for bidders with
higher leverage ratios and less cash; a result consistent with the idea that tender offers present
less financial flexibility to the bidder than mergers. Finally, we show that controlling for the
endogeneity of the deal structure, tenders are more expensive than mergers.
The existing literature identifies two key differences between mergers and tenders. First,
Betton et al. (2008) indicate that tenders for publicly-traded firms are faster than mergers.
Second, many articles have shown that the takeover premiums in tender offers are higher than in
mergers (Schwert, 1996; Officer, 2003; Moeller et al. (2004)).4 The major contribution of our
paper is that it shows why these relationships exist and how they are tied together via the tradeoff for the acquirer between speed and cost.
Our paper makes several other meaningful contributions. In particular, the insight that
bidder competition for the target is a key factor in the choice of acquisition method leads us to
the conclusion that the choice of method reveals new information about the two firms. For the
target, the choice of method signals new information about its synergies with the acquirer and the

4

However, other papers find no difference in the premiums between tenders and mergers (Huang and Walkling,
1987; Betton et al., 2008).
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market for its shares. For the bidder, the choice of method also signals new information about its
competitive interactions with other firms in the market, financial health, and likelihood for
regulatory scrutiny.
We also contribute to a better understanding of the nature of tender offers. Currently, top
M&A textbooks, including Bruner (2004) and DePamphilis (2011), do not explicitly address
how firms choose the method of the deal. In many empirical studies, the authors use a tender
offer dummy to proxy for the differences between tenders and mergers, without describing what
those differences are. Historically, there has also been an assumption in the finance literature that
tender offers are hostile.5 As Andrade et al. (2001) document, hostile tender offers almost
completely disappeared after the 1980s, yet tender offers did not disappear. Furthermore,
Schwert (2000) argues that that most deals described as hostile in the press are not
distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms. In our sample time period, friendly
tenders represent 99% of all tender offers. In all friendly cases, the tender offer price is
negotiated with the target’s board, in concert with its financial and legal advisors. Friendly tender
offers are the norm now, not the exception. Our research gives more guidance to financial and
legal scholars who wish to differentiate between the two methods of acquisitions.
In the next section, we offer a legal, regulatory, and empirical background on the choice
between tender and merger. In Section 3, we construct a model that incorporates the trade-off
between speed and cost; in Section 4, derive testable applications; in Section, 5 we discuss the
sample; while in Section 6, we present the empirical analysis. We conclude in Section 7.

5

There are some exceptions. For example, Comment and Jarrell (1987) note that tender offers can also involve prior
pre-announcement negotiations.
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2. Background
In this section we review the legal and regulatory environment of the acquisition market.
We place special attention on the speed of execution from both regulatory and strategic
perspective. At the end of the section, we review the existing academic literature on tender
offers.

2.1 Acquisition method and the speed of execution
Our focus in this study is on the time from the announcement of the deal to the
completion of the deal. Prior to the announcement, the bidder and target negotiate in private for
weeks or months. These negotiations are unknown to market participants, including the bidder’s
rivals. At the announcement of the agreement, new information is released to the market about
the value of the target. A bidding competitor has the opportunity to outbid its rival in the
window of time from announcement to completion, so that is the time period that is valuable in
our model.
There are three regulatory reasons that cash tender offers in the United States should be
faster from announcement to completion than mergers. First, the SEC has different filing
requirements for tenders and mergers. The only filing required to initiate a tender is the tender
offer statement (SC-TO). The SC-TO is filed on the same day that the tender offer begins.
Under SEC Rule 14d-1, the tender offer may end as soon as 20 calendar days after the initial
filing. The target shareholders do not vote in a cash tender offer, but they do in a merger, and a
shareholder vote takes time. In order to have a shareholder vote to approve a merger, SEC Rule
14d-6 requires the bidder to first file a preliminary proxy (PREM14a) with the SEC at least 10
days before distributing the definitive proxy to the shareholders (DEFM14a). Then, the target
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firm must distribute the definitive proxy statement to its shareholders announcing the meeting at
least 20 business days before the vote will occur. As a result, there is typically a two-month
lead-up to a shareholder vote in a merger.
Another regulatory difference in the U.S. between tenders and mergers is in the antitrust
review. The FTC and DOJ have 30 days to review a merger or exchange offer for antitrust
concerns under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, but only have 15 days for a cash tender offer. If either
agency requests additional information from the parties (known as a “second request”), the time
to complete the deal increases. Kirchner (2009) finds that it takes 157 days to resolve the average
second request. If the acquirer believes that a second request is likely, it will not rationally incur
the additional costs of a tender offer.6
Finally, mergers and tenders differ in their financing requirements. SEC Rule 14e-1(c)
requires the bidder to pay for tendered shares or return them to the shareholder within three days
of the close of the tender offer.7 SEC Rule 14e-8(c) deems a tender offer to be fraudulent if the
bidder does not have a reasonable belief that it can purchase the securities sought.8 Neither rule
explicitly requires tenders to be fully financed, but an acquirer would be exposing itself to
significant liability by commencing an offer without the means to pay for the shares. Practically
speaking, tender offers must be fully financed in order to meet the three-day requirement. In
contrast, merger agreements are often conditioned upon the acquirer securing financing.
Depending on market conditions, financing a merger can take months. Furthermore, if the
6

Once the second request is fulfilled, the agency will have an additional 30 day extension to complete its review for
mergers, but only ten days for tenders.
7
This rule, otherwise known as the “Prompt Payment Requirement,” only requires payment to be made “promptly,”
but does not define promptly. However, the SEC staff has interpreted promptly to mean three days. See Lynn
(2009).
8
In Release No. 33-7760, the SEC notes that, “Although not required, a commitment letter or other evidence of
financing ability (e.g., funds on hand or an existing credit facility) would in most cases be adequate to satisfy the
rule's requirement that the bidder have a reasonable belief that it can purchase the securities sought.” The SEC also
comments that, “In most cases when the bidder expects to obtain funds from another source, financing is arranged in
advance or immediately after announcing an offer.”
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acquirer is using a sizable amount of its own stock as consideration in the deal, then it may also
be required to hold a time-consuming shareholder vote to approve the merger. Given these three
regulatory differences, we expect that tender offers should be faster than mergers.

2.2 Speed of execution as a consideration in acquisitions
The evidence thus far suggests that tender offers have a substantially shorter completion
time than mergers. Execution speed could be an important consideration in the acquisition
market for a variety of reasons. Theory of decision making argues that early resolution of
uncertainty generally allows for better allocation of resources. Mergers represent a dramatic
shock to every organization, and the uncertainty surrounding the merger outcome could
adversely affect all stakeholders associated with the firm, such as customers, suppliers, and
employees, resulting in the erosion of value. For example, in response to the Oracle tender offer
in June of 2003, PeopleSoft warns, “As a consequence of the uncertainty surrounding their roles
and the companies' future, our key employees…may seek other employment opportunities.”9
Consistent with this idea, Hertzel et al. (2008) also find that firm uncertainty regarding financial
distress exhibits adverse effect on its suppliers.
A major incentive for the timely completion of takeovers arises from bidder competition.
Extensive research suggests that mergers could be an important factor in the creation and
sustainability of competitive advantage (Trautwein, 1990). Some of the sources of competitive
advantage in mergers are synergies, others – economies of scope and scale (Betton et al. 2008).
Horizontal mergers could also strengthen market power, while vertical mergers could reduce
‘hold-up’ production costs (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1988). Many authors

9

PeopleSoft S-4, filed June 19, 2003.
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have also emphasized the importance of complementarities at the level of organizational culture
as a source of competitive advantage in acquisitions (Porter, 1987; Datta, 1991).
The merger market is highly competitive – in our sample, 39.7 percent of all deals are
contested. First movers could gain a long-term competitive advantage in modern markets. As a
result, the speedy execution of a merger could minimize the chance that a competitive bidder
“steals” the target or raises its price. Many authors have also suggested that pressured by
competition, firms often over-bid for a target, a phenomenon known as the “winner’s curse”
(Gilberto et al. 1989).
There is also anecdotal evidence that the different speed of execution across tender offers
and mergers is well recognized and considered by the market. Several companies acknowledge
in their SEC filings that the use of a tender offer will help the deal reach conclusion faster. For
instance, in the 2007 tender offer for Biosite Inc. by Inverness Medical Innovations Inc., the
background of the Offer to Purchase stated “Biosite’s advisors indicated on multiple occasions
Biosite’s board of directors’ strong preference for a two-step tender offer structure, which would
take a shorter period of time to deliver the consideration to Biosite’s shareholders that elected to
tender in the tender offer than would a one-step merger structure.”10 Many well-publicized deals
were also very likely structured as mergers rather than tender offers due to a perceived lack of
competitiveness – for example, the AT&T/T-Mobile deal (Verizon was too big and Sprint was
having financial difficulties) or the Delta/Northwest merger (United and Continental were busy
with their own merger and American was too big).
In our subsequent analysis, we will test whether tenders are in fact faster than mergers
and attempt to determine why some firms choose not to take advantage of that speed.

10

See page 29 of Exhibit 99.(A)(1)(A) to the Schedule TO-T filed by Inverness with the SEC on 5/29/2007.
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2.3 Related literature
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two theoretical studies that attempt to
explain the choice of the takeover mechanism. Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) model mergers as
a bargaining game between the acquiring and target firms and tender offers as an auction in
which bidders arrive sequentially and compete for the target. A basic assumption of their model
is that once mergers are announced, there is no possibility for competitive bids, which is
increasingly violated in recent times. Schnitzer (1996) analyzes the choice between a hostile and
a friendly takeover. Our study is different because it focuses on the choice between mergers and
tender offers and explores a different trade-off in the market place.
The empirical work in this field has identified mathematical correlations, but does not
rigorously explain why these correlations exist. The seminal work of Bradley et al. (1983)
indicates that tenders create value by generating new information about the target in the takeover
process. However, their methods and results are equally applicable to mergers, so their findings
do not point acquirers to one particular takeover method. Betton et al. (2008) acknowledge that,
“systematic empirical evidence on the choice of merger versus tender offer is only beginning to
emerge.”
That said, the empirical literature does identify some important differences between
tender offers and mergers. First, Betton et al. (2008) find that the average tender offer for a
publicly-traded target by a publicly-traded acquirer is completed about 36 days faster than a
similar merger. The legal structure that we documented previously suggests that tenders should
be faster, and the evidence in Betton et al. supports this notion. Second, Betton et al. (2009) find
that tenders are more likely to be completed than mergers. If the primary cost of a merger over a
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tender offer is the cost of losing the target, then their finding suggests that this cost is indeed
lower in tenders.
Empirical research also suggests that tender offers are more expensive than mergers but
the evidence is not robust. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that target shareholders
earn higher premiums in tenders than in mergers. However, Huang and Walkling (1987) argue
that after controlling for the payment method and the degree of resistance, the difference in
abnormal returns between tender offers and mergers is insignificant. We note that the literature
usually does not address the endogeneity of the acquisition form, which could significantly affect
the inferences. However, predicting the choice of acquisition form requires a theoretical
framework suggesting what the predictors might be.

3. A Simple Model
The background review in the previous section reveals that tender offers should be faster
than mergers, but at a cost. Real option theory has for long recognized that waiting (or the speed
of execution of an action) could have costs and benefits for the actor. Within the context of
corporate acquisitions, if the costs of waiting outweigh the benefits, the deal will be structured as
a tender offer and vice versa – if the costs of waiting are relatively small compared to the
benefits, the deal will be structured as a merger.
The cost of waiting for the bidder that we are concerned with is the cost of failing to gain
control of the target, through the acquisition of the target by another entity. In this case, the
bidder bears a cost because it does not capture the synergy gains. Furthermore, the fact that the
target is acquired by a competitor could result in loss of a competitive advantage.
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Similarly, there are costs to the target in not waiting. The most obvious cost is the
forgone option to shop for a better deal. In order to forgo this real option, the target must be
compensated. The target is effectively selling its go-shop option to the bidder in exchange for a
higher premium, which becomes the bidder’s cost of not waiting. In our model that follows, we
evaluate the trade-off between the costs of waiting and the costs of not waiting, with an eye on
the empirical predictions that the model generates.
Suppose the value of the target shares for a potential bidder (acquirer) is vB , while the
value of the target shares for the target shareholders is v s . As Grossman and Hart (1980) argue,
the transaction will take place only when vB  vs . The value v s could be interpreted as a
reservation price for the target shareholders. As long as the offer-price exceeds that reservation
value, the deal would be completed.
While the bidder is at an informational advantage in evaluating the synergies associated
with the acquisition, the target is not. There are two possibilities for the target regarding a
particular acquisition. On the one hand, the synergy created by the deal could be unique to the
particular bidder. For example, it could reflect some unique complementarity of the asset
structure of the bidder and the assets of the target. In this case, the assets of the target have no
superior alternative use outside of the ownership of the bidder. On the other hand, the synergies
that the target firm brings might not be that unique to the bidder and other firms could potentially
be able to generate even higher surplus with the acquisition of the firm. The latter possibility
raises the reservation price of the target firm. We can assume that the private valuation of the
target firm for the value of its shares under alternative ownership could take two possible values

v sL and v sH ( v sL  v sH ). The first valuation corresponds to the reservation price for the target
shareholders in the case in which there is no other bidder in the market; the second valuation
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corresponds to the existence of an alternative bidder with a higher private valuation of the target
shares.
We consider the following timeline. At t = 0, the bidder (with a private valuation v B )
discovers the target and observes whether there is an alternative potential bidder with higher
private valuation ( v H  vB ). At t = 1, the acquirer announces a takeover bid which could be
structured either as a tender offer or a merger. The tender offer has a shorter expected completion
time and assures that the competing firm would not be able to join the bidding contest and outbid
the acquirer.11 The merger has longer completion time, which results in an additional erosion of
value for the bidder in the amount c (we describe some of these costs in Section 3). However, in
the case of merger, if there is a competing bidder in the market place with higher valuation it
enters the contest and the acquirer loses the target to the competing firm. The latter outcome
results in some permanent loss of value for the bidder due to loss in competitive advantage or
relative market share C . At t = 2, the target firm arrives at a private valuation of its reservation
price and the deal takes place.
Assume that the acquirer receives p percent of the surplus created by the acquisition
(such that p > 0), and the target receives the remaining 1 - p percent of the surplus. Then the gain
to the bidder under the different scenarios could be expressed as follows:

11

In reality, a tender offer would only reduce the probability that the bidder could lose the target to a competitor and
not necessarily completely eliminate this possibility. This simplifying assumption, however, does not affect
significantly the major inferences in the paper.
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No competition

Competition

Tender offer

p  (v B  v S )

p  (v B  v S )

Merger

p  (v B  v S )  p  c

C

From here, it becomes clear that in the presence of a competitive bidder the acquirer
would never choose to structure the deal as a merger given that, in this case, it will suffer
permanent loss in value. As a result, the announcement of a merger would automatically signal
to the target poor market opportunities for its assets and the target would revise its reservation
price to vsL . In this case, the gain for the bidder would be p  (vB  vSL  c) and the gain for the

target would be (1  p )  (vB  vSL  c) .
Let’s consider the more interesting case of no competitive bidders in the market place.
Although the acquirer might be able to evaluate this possibility reliably well, it is potentially very
difficult to communicate this information reliably to the target. If the acquirer chooses to
structure the deal as a tender offer, the target would update its reservation price to v SH ; if the
acquirer chooses to structure the deal as a merger, the target would update its reservation price
to vSL . In the case of no competitive bidding, the deal would be structured as a tender offer only if

p  (vB  vSH )  p  (vB  vSL )  p  c

(1)

From here it follows that under no competition, the deal will be structured as a tender
offer only when:

c  v SH  v SL

(2)
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The above result is intuitive. It says that under no competition, a deal would be structured
as a tender offer only when the cost of waiting associated with a merger is relatively high
compared to the value loss due to increase in the takeover premium. An important assumption in
this line of reasoning is that the acquirer cannot signal reliably to the target the lack of alternative
outside options for its assets in the market.
Note also that our model also generates the following relationship between the price of
the target in a tender offer and the price in a merger:

PTO  vSH  (1  p)  (vB  vSH )  vSL  (1  p )  (vB  vSL )  (1  p )  c  PM

(3)

Regardless of whether there is competition, our model predicts that the premium will be always
higher in a tender than in a merger.
Our model relies on the assumption that the acquirer loses a value C when the target is
merged with a competitor. This corresponds to the loss that Bradley et al. (1983) observe when a
tender offer bid is lost to a rival firm. As a result of the rival getting control of the target, the
bidder not only loses the target, but they also lose the competitive advantage that the rival wins
by gaining control of the rival’s assets.
In summary, our model predicts that an acquirer will always use a tender offer as the
acquisition method when there is competition for the target, and may use a tender when there is
no competition if the costs of waiting are sufficiently high. Also, our model predicts that
premiums will be higher in tender offers than in mergers. Finally, the model implies that returns
to rival acquirers should be lower in tenders than in mergers. All of these predictions assume that
the deal can legally or practically be structured as a tender offer.
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4. Empirical Design

We argue that when choosing their acquisition method firms trade-off the strategic
benefits of speed with the cost of a higher premium. The starting point of our analysis is the
assumption that tender offers have shorter completion times than mergers. In the previous
section, we presented legal and regulatory arguments for this assumption.12 However, empirical
evidence is necessary to confirm this conjecture. Thus, our first empirical test is on:
Hypothesis 1. Tender offers have shorter completion times than mergers.
Our major empirical prediction regarding the choice of acquisition method is outlined in
the following:
Hypothesis 2. Firms with significant competitive threats and other costs of waiting
choose tender offers.
We consider three proxies for competitiveness – indicators for a competitive bidder,
solicited deal, and prior relationship. Evaluating the competitive environment of a bidder exante is highly speculative. As a result, we construct an ex-post measure of competitiveness
indicating whether there was a competitive bid for the target prior to the announcement.13 Such a
bid would generally decrease the amount of time the acquirer has to close the deal. In this case,
the choice of a slower acquisition method would significantly reduce the chances of acquiring
the target.
Next, we identify whether the bid was solicited by the target. Target-initiated deals are
less likely to exhibit synergies that are strategically important to a large group of bidders.

12

Completion time is the time from the first official announcement of the bid to the final approval of the deal. It
does not include the time of any private negotiations between the two parties since such negotiations are not public
information.
13
We learn this information by reading the background of the deal in the DEFM14a for mergers and the SC TO-t or
S-4 in tenders. Bids are classified as competitive if the acquirer had to raise its bid or make a counter-offer to beat
another bidder. The identity of the other bidder is almost never disclosed in the filings.
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Otherwise, these synergies would have been discovered by the market. Soliciting firms are
seemingly rushing to sell themselves for some idiosyncratic reasons. Therefore, we expect
solicited deals to be less likely to be structured as tender offers. Our indicator variable for
solicited deals takes the value of one if the acquirer’s bid was the result of a formal solicitation
process, and zero otherwise (we obtain this information from SEC filings).
Our third measure of the competitive environment of the bidder is a variable indicating
whether the bidder and the target disclose some prior relationship in their filings. That prior
relationship may be a licensing agreement, joint venture, or a simple customer/supplier
connection.14 Joint history implies that very likely some relationship-specific investment has
been made on the bidder-side. Such investment makes a competitive threat potentially more
costly to the firm. As a result, we predict that deals involving firms with prior relationship are
more likely to be tender offers.
We also consider a set of variables proxing for other (non-competitive) costs of waiting –
a second request dummy, acquirer high debt dummy, cash offer dummy, and deal relative value.
Our sample includes deals in which the FTC, DOJ, or other governmental agency created a delay
in the closing via a second request or similar extended review.15 The firms in an acquisition often
hire specialized attorneys specifically to help clear the governmental hurdles, and these lawyers
presumably know whether a deal is likely to be slowed by a second request.16 Therefore, we
hypothesize that firms will choose a merger over a tender if there is a high probability of a

14

Disclosure in the proxy or offer statement of past transactions is required by Item 1005 of Regulation M-A. We
also learn this information by reading the background of the deal in the SEC filings.
15
We also find deals that experienced lengthy reviews by the Federal Aviation Adminsitration (FAA), Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), Surface Transportation Board (STB), and various state agencies.
16
For example, in the Background of the Merger between XM and Sirius, the parties note that, “SIRIUS and XM
agreed to discuss with their respective counsel the likelihood of obtaining the required regulatory approvals for a
combination.” It goes on to identify two specific law firms that were competent in this area, one for the DOJ/FTC
approval and another for the FCC approval. See page 20 of the DEFM14A filed by XM Satellite Holdings with the
SEC on 10/9/2007.
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second request. The acquirer high debt dummy, cash offer dummy and relative value proxy for
the ability of the bidder to make a fully-financed offer. We expect that the greater the financing
impediments to a takeover, the more likely it is that it will be organized as a merger.
A major prediction of our model is that the premium under tender offers would always
exceed the premium under mergers (for the same companies). Unfortunately, we cannot observe
a deal which is simultaneously structured as both – a tender offer and a merger. Companies
always choose one (the optimal) option guided by a wide range of factors some of which could
be correlated with the expected premium. The endogeneity of the deal structure makes it difficult
to make direct empirical predictions about the association between the deal structure and the
premium in the cross section. One way to address this problem is to identify instrumental
variables that predict the acquisition method but not the expected premium and use these
variables to isolate the exogenous variation in acquisition method choice. Hypothesis 2 suggests
a large set of potential instruments. As a result, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 3. In the cross-section of deals, the instrumented tender offer-indicator is
positively correlated with the acquisition premium.
Finally, if strategic considerations are an important motivation for bidders to demand
execution speed we would expect tender offers to be associated with more strategically important
acquisitions. As a result, we predict the following
Hypothesis 4. Tender offers are accompanied with lower announcement returns for the
rivals of the bidding firm than mergers.
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5. Data and Summary Statistics

This study focuses on the post-2006 period because the revision of the SEC’s Best Price
Rule in 2006 reduced the tremendous legal uncertainty in the tender offer market. The original
Best Price Rule specified that all investors holding the same class of securities had to be paid the
same consideration per share in a tender offer. However, the wording of the rule was not clear
about whether executive compensation triggered by the tender offer was included in the
definition of “consideration,” so it was left to the courts to decide. A series of conflicting rulings
by the 2nd, 7th, and 9th U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals (during the 1995–2002 period) about the
applicability of executive compensation to the definition of consideration created some
additional uncertainty about the acquisition costs of tender offers. As a result, the Best Price Rule
was amended effective December 8, 2006 to require that compensation payments be excluded
from the definition of consideration. A more detailed history of the Best Price Rule is presented
in Appendix 2. Figure 1 shows the significant drop-off in tender offers from 2002 to 2006, and
the rebound after the revision of the Best Price Rule in 2006.
Therefore, we form a sample of U.S.-based targets taken over by U.S.-based acquirers in
deals announced between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010 from the Thomson Financial
SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. We require all of the targets in our sample to
be based in the United States so that U.S. takeover law applies to the deal. We require all
acquirers to meet the same criteria to avoid complications arising from differing foreign tax and
legal regimes. We require all deals to be completed so that we can accurately measure time to
completion. The time-to-completion is measured from the day the deal is announced to the day
the deal is effective.
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Given that large part of the data is hand-collected, we limit our sample to deals in which
the acquirer holds more than 90% of the target’s equity. A tender offer is most beneficial to the
acquirer when at least 90% of the target’s existing common stock is tendered.17 We also require
all firms in our sample, targets and acquirers, to be listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or American
Stock Exchange. Consistent with the literature, we also remove from our sample all deals in the
heavily regulated financial and utilities industries. Our final sample consists of 213 mergers and
95 tender offers, for a total sample of 308 completed deals. In comparison, the sample in
Hartzell et al. (2004) is 235 firms and Boone and Mulherin (2007) end up with 400 observations.
For each deal, we calculate the takeover premium as the offer price less the stock price
four weeks prior to the announcement date, divided by the price four weeks prior.

For

robustness, we also calculate the premiums with two-month returns, rather than four-week
returns. In Table 1, we present summary statistics for the sample of mergers and tender offers
over the period from 2007-2010. We observe that tender offers are characterized with
significantly higher premiums and shorter completion times. We also show that about 38% of
tenders have competitive bidders, but only 14% of mergers. Parties with prior relationships are
far more likely to structure the deal as a tender than a merger. Deals that will be delayed by a
second request are also more likely to be structured as mergers. Collectively, these results
suggest that the choice of method is likely to be tender offer when time is of the essence.
The SEC rule that the financing must be secured before the tender offer commences also
seems to affect the choice of method in three ways. First, as also noted by Travlos (1987),
tenders are far more likely to be financed with cash than with equity. Second, targets of tenders

17

In 48 of the 50 states, if an acquirer ends up with at least 90% of the shares, they can complete the second step of
the tender offer with a short-form merger, which does not require a shareholder vote. However, any tender offer can
be completed if the bidder receives a voting majority, as defined in the target’s articles of incorporation. Usually the
voting majority is defined as either a simple majority or two-thirds majority.
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are smaller than in mergers, relative to the acquirer. Smaller targets may require less complex
financing arrangements or none at all. Third, the acquirer is more likely to choose a merger over
a tender offer when its debt-to-assets ratio exceeds 0.5. In sum, the results in Table 1 suggest
that the choice of method is driven in part by the legal structure and in part by competition for
the target.

6. Results

6.1 Time to completion
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates and robust P-values from OLS regressions of the
number of days from the announcement of the deal to the effective date of the deal on a tender
offer dummy and control variables. In column 1, we test the robustness of the correlation
between tender offers and completion time. The coefficient on the tender dummy is -64.6 days
and significant at the 1% level. In other words, in this parsimonious test, tenders reach
completion about 65 days faster than mergers.
In column 2, we expand the model to include the groups of variables that explain the
legal & financial constraints on the deal, as well as the competitive environment surrounding the
deal. The results of the regression in the second column of Table 2 can be summarized as
follows. First, controlling for all of these other factors, tenders are still about 35 days faster than
mergers. Second, the legal and financial constraints on the deal do affect the time it takes to get
the deal done. For instance, our model suggests that cash bids are completed about 29 days faster
but a second request adds 114 days. Finally, the competitive environment for the bidder has no
bearing on the time to completion, controlling for the choice of method. This result highlights
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the fact that acquirers choose an acquisition method that is appropriate to the level of
competition.
In column 3 of the table, we add industry and year fixed-effects. We observe that the
economic and statistical significance of the tender offer variable is robust to the inclusion of
these additional controls.

6.2 Choice of acquisition method
We presented strong empirical evidence that takeover deals are faster than mergers. The
main premise of the paper is that the choice of acquisition method is determined by the tradeoff
of execution speed versus execution cost. Given this fact, we should be able to predict with some
accuracy whether a deal will be structured as a merger or a tender offer.
In Table 3, we estimate the probability for a takeover deal to be structured as a tender
offer. In the first two models, we report the marginal effects from a probit model, while in the
last two models, we report the coefficient estimates from a linear probability model. The
explanatory variables include our proxies for competition for the target and costs of waiting
discussed in Section 3. We also include a number of financial variables for the bidder and target
as additional controls. The description of the construction of each variable is in Appendix 1. All
of these values are calculated as of the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the takeover
announcement.
Each of the coefficients on the variables describing the level of competition for the target
have the expected sign and are significant at the 5% level or better. In particular, we find that the
presence of a competitive bidder increases the probability for a tender offer by around 18
percent. Bids for targets with a prior relationship with the bidder are also more likely to be
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structured as tender offers. As noted, losing such firms to a competitor would be more costly to a
bidder who has made some relationship-specific investments. Finally, we show that solicited bids
are less likely to take the form of tender offers. Given that solicited bids are initiated by the
target, they are also less likely to exhibit any strategically important complementarities for the
bidder.
Next, we find that the probability for a tender offer decreases with the expected time to
completion of the tender offer. Deals that receive a second request for information from
regulators are less likely to be structured as tender offers. As described in Section 3, the
additional delay caused by such requests effectively eliminates all execution speed benefits of
tender offers. Acquirers with high debt levels are also less likely to pursue a tender offer, very
likely due to decreased financing flexibility. Consistent with this idea, we also find that tender
offers are more likely to be made in cash than mergers.
We also include in all models financial variables that Kohers et al. (2007) find are
correlated with the choice of method. As an additional robustness test, we also estimate a linear
probability-model with and without industry and year fixed effects and get very similar results.
Our models also explain more than 31 percent of the variation in the choice of acquisition
method.

6.3 Acquisition premium
In order to establish a causal relationship from the acquisition method towards the
acquisition premium, a source of exogenous variation in the choice of method is necessary.
Throughout the paper, we justify that the competitiveness of the bidder industry and other costs
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of prolonging the deal would be the main determinants of the acquisition method choice. We also
present empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture in Table 3.
In this section, we estimate a two-stage IV-regression model for the acquisition premium.
If Ti denotes an indicator variable for a tender offer, INSTi – the instruments, PRM i

- the

acquisition premium, X i – a set of control variables, and FE – industry- and year-fixed effects,
the first-stage regression is:
Ti      INSTi    X i  FE ,

(4)

while the second-stage regression is:
PRM i   *   *  Tˆi   * X i  FE ,

(5)

where T̂i is the instrumented tender-offer variable at the first stage.
The two stages are estimated jointly in a two-stage least squares regression model. We
use as exogenous instruments for the choice of acquisition method the following variables:
indicators for solicited deals, prior bidder-target relationship, acquirer’s high debt, and second
information request, as well as the relative value ratio. As shown in Table 3, these variables are
significant predictors of the tender offer choice. It is also very unlikely that they would predict
the takeover premium directly (we intentionally exclude the competitive bidder and cash
variables from the list of instrumental variables since they could be linked to the premium
through other channels). The dependent variable at the second stage is the takeover premium.
Table 4 presents coefficient estimates and standard errors from the second stage of the
two-stage least squares estimation. We find that tender offers are associated with higher
acquisition premia than mergers. This result supports Hypothesis #3 and thereby lends additional
support to our theoretical model. We also find that the premium increases with the size of the
bidder and decreases with the size of the target. The minimum eigenvalue F-statistics indicate
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that the instruments are sufficiently powerful according to the Staiger-Stock test (Staiger and
Stock 1997).18

6.4 Rival reactions
To test our fourth hypothesis, we present a test for the link between competition and the
choice of acquisition method. The basic idea is that strategically important acquisitions would be
perceived as negative news by the bidder’s competitors. Since competitive pressure creates an
incentive for bidders to move fast and structure their deals as tenders, we would expect to
observe a negative stock price reaction of the firm’s competitors at the announcement of a tender
offer. Importantly, we also predict that we will not observe such reactions in the case of mergers.
In Table 5, we compare announcement-period returns for the acquirer's rivals in mergers
and tender offers. We use the market-model to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
with a value-weighted index over the windows from [-2,2] and [-1,1] centered around the
announcement date. We define rivals as firms in the same four-digit SIC industry with a ratio of
acquirer assets-to-rival assets in the range from 0.25 to 4.0.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we observe that both the mean and median stock price
reactions of bidder competitors are consistently negative in the case of tender offers and
consistently positive in the case of mergers. The return difference is also statistically and
economically significant. For example, the first column in Panel A indicates rival returns are
1.23 percent lower in tender offers than in mergers.

18

We obtain similarly significant results if we use a probit in the first stage rather than an OLS model.
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7. Conclusion

Corporate takeovers include some of the largest business transactions in the modern
economy and have strong consequences for shareholders, employees, and other firm
stakeholders. Not surprisingly, takeovers have been the subject of active academic research in
numerous fields – from sociology and labor economics to political science and game theory.
Almost every facet of the acquisition market has been carefully analyzed by researchers as it
relates to fundamental questions concerning the boundaries of the firm, the quality of corporate
governance, and the scope of government regulation.
Historically, there have been two ways to acquire a publicly traded company – friendly
and hostile. In the friendly case, the bidding entity submits a proposal to the target board of
directors which is usually followed by a vote. In the hostile case, the bidder goes directly to the
target shareholders with an offer to tender their shares at a specified price, hence the name
“tender offer”. Interestingly, the attitude of tender offers has gradually changed over time – they
are friendly now – but the form of bidding has not disappeared. Why? The choice of acquisition
method, while an important decision, remains relatively understudied in the academic literature.
In this paper, we highlight some important regulatory differences between tender offers
and mergers, which could affect the acquisition method choice. Given that historically hostile
tender offers have been viewed as an efficient corporate governance mechanism, government
regulations were designed to help resolve tender offers quickly and efficiently. Friendly merger
proposals, on the other hand, are given lower priority. As a result, bidders who prefer fast
execution (due to bidder competition or other factors) would tend to structure the acquisition as a
tender offer. However, tender offers also come with a cost because they signal to the target a
higher value and encourage the target to raise its reservation price. Our theoretical prediction is
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that, in equilibrium, bidders trade-off the execution speed benefits of tender offers with the lower
premium benefits of mergers.
We also present empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions. In
particular, we show that tender offers are faster but more expensive than mergers. Tender offers
are also more likely for strategically important acquisitions and acquisitions in more competitive
environment than mergers. Finally, we show that rivals suffer lower returns in tender offers than
mergers.
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions
Variable
De al outcomes
Four-Week Premium

Defininition

Source

Acquisition premium calculated as the difference between the
offer price and the stock price four weeks before the
anouncement date.
Market-Model Premium Acquisition premium calculated as in Schwert (1996) using the
market model over the window [-63, min(close, 126)].
Days to Complete
Number of calendar days from the data announced to the
effective date.
De al Characteristics
Relative Value
Value of the deal divided by the sum of the value of the deal
and the market value of the acquirer's assets.
Solicited Bid
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target
creates a formal process to find a buyer for itself.
Second Request
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if either party
receives a second request for information from the Department
of Justice or Federal Trade Commission under the Hart-ScottRodino Act.
Competitive Bidder
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquirer
had to make a counter-offer or raise its bid to beat another
bidder.
Prior Relationsip
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firms
disclose prior business dealings in the SEC filings.
All Cash Bid
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if 100% of the
consideration offered for the target's shares is cash.
Deal Value
"Total value of consideration paid by the acquiror, excluding
(US$, millions)
fees and expenses," including the value of assumed liabilities.
Firm Characteristics
Sales
(US$, millions)
Book Assets
(US$, millions)
Market Value of Assets

Debt/Assets

High Debt Dummy
EBITDA/Assets

Market/Book

Sales (SALE) as of the end of the fiscal year immediately
preceding the acquisition.
Assets (AT) as of the end of the fiscal year immediately
preceding the acquisition.
Debt (DLTT+DLC) plus common stock (PRCCF*CSHO) plus
preferred stock (PSTKL) minus deferred taxes (TXDC) and
investment tax credits (ITCI).
The ratio of long-term debt (DLTT) to the market value of
assets (see above) as of the end of the fiscal year immediately
preceding the acquisition.
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm's
Debt/Assets (see above) exceeds 0.5.
Income (OIBDP) divided by the market value of assets (see
above) as of the end of the fiscal year immediately preceding
the acquisition.
The market value of assets (see above) divided by the book
value of assets (AT).

28

CRSP, Eventus

CRSP, Eventus
SDC

SDC,
Compustat
Edgar
Edgar, Lexis
Nexis

Edgar

Edgar
SDC
SDC

Compustat
Compustat
Compustat

Compustat

Compustat
Compustat

Compustat

Appendix 2: Brief History of the Best Price Rule (SEC Rule 14d-10)

The regulatory environment for tender offers has been in flux in the United States for many
years. In 1986, the SEC adopted Rule 14d-10, otherwise known as the “Best Price Rule.” This
regulation specified that, “the consideration paid to any security holder pursuant to the tender
offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder during such tender offer.” In
other words, all investors holding the same class of securities had to be paid the same amount per
share in a tender offer. The wording of the rule was not clear about whether executive
compensation triggered by the tender offer was included in the definition of “consideration,” so
it was left to the courts to decide.

Beginning in 1995, the courts ruled that executive

compensation contingent on the change-in-control could be part of the consideration paid to the
executives for their shares.19 From 1995 to 2002, the 2nd, 7th, and 9th U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals made conflicting rulings about the applicability of executive compensation to the
definition of consideration. Although tender offers did not disappear during this time, there was
uncertainty as to whether a buyer might have to go back after completing the deal and pay the
non-executive target shareholders additional compensation to make them whole.
The uncertainty about Rule 14d-10 peaked following the resolution of the case of Gerber
v. Computer Associates International (CA) from the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of
Appeals.20 In that case, a jury awarded shareholders an additional $5.7 million after finding that
a $5 million non-compete payment to the CEO was consideration in the tender offer under Rule
14d-10. Given that CA paid $120 million for the target, the judgment added 4.75% to their costs,
not including the costs of litigating the case for nearly 11 years.

19
20

See, for example, Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995)
Gerber vs. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 303 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2002).
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The September, 2002 decision in Gerber v. CA in particular made it extremely risky for a
target firm to make payments to executives that were contingent upon a change in control.
Based on this ruling, acquiring firms in tender offers were exposed to substantial liability if the
target firm made payments to any executive via golden parachute, retention agreement,
accelerated vesting, or consulting agreement, as all could be included as consideration in the
tender offer. Motivated by this decision, the SEC chose to clarify that its intention with the best
price rule was to exclude executive compensation. As a result, Rule 14d-10 was amended
effective December 8, 2006 to require that, “the consideration paid to any security holder for
securities tendered in the tender offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security
holder for securities tendered in the tender offer.” In other words, compensation payments are
excluded from the new version of the best price rule.
There is anecdotal evidence that the court rulings from 1995 to 2002, and specifically in
the Gerber v. CA case, skewed the takeover markets away from tender offers until the revision of
Rule 14d-10 in 2006. In a joint letter submitted to the SEC in 2005 upon its request for
comments on the proposed changes to the rule, seven top law firms noted that:
Given the current disarray among courts with respect to the proper interpretation
of Rule 14d-10 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) — and
the significant litigation risks entailed in the tender offer process because of these court
interpretations — most law firms are advising their clients not to commence tender offers
if other acquisition structures are available that do not have the possible adverse
consequences of the best-price rule — even if such other structures may be less
economically efficient for companies and their shareholders.21
21

Letter to the SEC regarding File No: S7-11-05; Release Nos. 34-52968; IC-27193 Amendments to the Tender
Offer Best-Price Rule (the “Release”), sent February 21, 2006 by Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP; Davis Polk &
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Similar sentiment can be observed in newsletters that law firms sent to their clients after Rule
14d-10 was revised. For instance, in November, 2006, the law firm Morrison Foerster alerted its
clients, “We anticipate that with the amendments (to Rule 14d-10) companies will use tender
offers more frequently...”22 Later, in guidance to clients of the law firm Skadden Arps Slate
Meagher & Flom, Ward et al. (2011) note that, ”This resurgence (in tender offers) is largely due
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 2006 clarification to the all holders/best price
rule regarding the treatment of employee compensation in tender offers.” Given that Offenberg
and Officer (2012) find that most firms now have substantial change-in-control compensation
contacts, there is reason to believe that acquiring firms were actively avoiding tenders from 2003
through 2006 so as to avoid the corresponding liability. As a result, there should have been an
increase in tender offers after 2006.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of deals completed by tender offer in the United States
from 1995 through 2010. Empirically, the impact of the Gerber decision appears obvious in
Figure 1. Tender offers represent 14.2% of deals in 2002, but only 3.2% in 2006. The market for
tender offers rebounds quickly after 2006, with 20% of deals executed as tenders in 2008 &
2009. Any empirical study on the choice of method must account for the legal ambiguity in the
tender offer rules, particularly from 2002 through 2006. Given that the tender offer market was
so skewed by the ambiguous interpretations of Rule 14d-10 and other legal changes, we focus
our empirical analysis on deals initiated after 2006.

Wardwell; Latham & Watkins, LLP; Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
LLP; Sullivan & Cromwell LLP; and Sullivan & Cromwell LLP.
22
Morrison Foerster Client Alert, “SEC Amends Tender Offer ‘Best Price’ Rule,” 11/6/2006, retrieved from:
http://www.mofo.com/pubs/xpqPublicationDetail.aspx%3fxpST%3dPubDetail%26pub%3d7260
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Table 1
Sample characteristics
The table reports the average four-week premium, calculated as the difference between the offer price and the stock
price four weeks before the announcement date; the market model premium, defined as the cumulative abnormal
return of the target over the window [-63, min(close, 126)]; the number of days to completion; and deal, acquirer,
and target characteristics across mergers (first column) and tender offers (second column) for the period from 2007
through 2010. Relative value is the value of the deal divided by the sum of the value of the deal and the market
value of the acquirer's assets; all cash bid is an indicator variable for 100% cash offers; second request is dummy
variable that takes the value of one if either party receives a second request for information from the Department of
Justice or Federal Trade Commission under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act; solicited bid is dummy variable that takes
the value of one if the target creates a formal process to find a buyer for itself; competitive bidder is an indicator for
deals involving at least two different bidders; prior relationship is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firms
disclose prior business dealings in the SEC filings; a high debt dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the firm's debt-to-asset ratio exceeds the industry median. Detailed definition of all variables is outlined in
Appendix 1. The last column presents the differences of the corresponding characteristics across mergers and tender
offers. Acquirers in these deals are public firms that held less than 10% of the target before the acquisition and more
than 90% after. The minimum deal size is US$1 million. (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.

Variable

Difference

Merger

Tender Offer

Deal outcomes
Four-Week Premium
Two-Month Premium
Days to Complete

44.14%
42.69%
134

58.40%
58.99%
58

14.26%
16.30%
-76

**

Deal Characteristics
Relative Value
All Cash Bid
Second Request
Solicited Bid
Competitive Bidder
Prior Relationship
Deal Value (US$, millions)

16.48%
42.25%
14.49%
38.16%
14.49%
8.21%
2,305

8.86%
92.63%
2.10%
31.58%
37.89%
17.89%
1,079

-7.62%
50.38%
-12.39%
-6.58%
23.40%
9.68%
-1,226

***

Acquirer Characteristics
Sales (US$, millions)
Book Assets (US$, millions)
High Debt Dummy
EBITDA/Assets
Market/Book

14,994
20,843
11.27%
6.27%
136%

20,166
25,358
2.10%
10.06%
158%

5,172
4,515
-9.17%
3.79%
22%

*

Target Characteristics
Sales (US$, millions)
Book Assets (US$, millions)
Debt/Assets
EBITDA/Assets
Market/Book
Observations

1,262
2,034
19.22%
1.60%
158%
213

399
466
11.05%
0.40%
215%
95

-863
-1,568
-8.17%
-1.20%
57%

***

***
***

***
***

***
***
**

***
***
**

***
***

***

Table 2
Completion time regressions
The table reports the coefficient estimates and robust P-values from OLS regressions of the number of days from the
announcement of the deal to the effective date of the deal on a tender offer dummy; deal relative value; an indicator
for a cash offer; an indicator for high-debt acquirers (debt-to-asset ratio exceeding the industry median); (log of)
acquirer and target assets; and indicators for a second request for information on the deal from the Department of
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, solicited deals, contested offers, and prior relationship between the bidder
and the target. The sample period is 2007-2010. The last two rows report the total number of observations and
adjusted R-squared in each regression. Detailed definition of all variables is outlined in Appendix 1. (***), (**), and
(*) indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.

Tender Offer dummy

(1)
-75.6

(2)
-35.3

(3)
-38.5

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

61.1

46.7

(0.120)

(0.114)

-33.6

-21.6

(0.000)***

(0.052)*

-14.7

-21.6

(0.128)

(0.362)

118.8

115.1

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

-0.3

-6.5

(0.973)

(0.547)

1.2

2.4

(0.861)

(0.673)

6.1

10.3

(0.407)

(0.135)

0.5

-1.5

(0.817)

(0.481)

2.3

2.2

(0.362)

(0.185)

133.8

61.9

71.3

Legal/Financial Impediments to Tenders
Relative Value
All Cash Bid
Acquirer's High Debt dummy
Second Request dummy
Competition for Target
Solicited
Competitive Bidder dummy
Prior Relationship dummy
Financials
Acquirer Ln(Sales)
Target Ln(Sales)
Intercept

(0.000)***

(0.224)

(0.021)**

Industry Fixed-Effects

No

No

Yes

Year Fixed-Effects

No

No

Yes

308
0.177

295
0.468

295
0.504

Firms
Adjusted R-squared
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Table 3
Choice of method regressions
The table reports the marginal effects from Probit- and the coefficient estimates from OLS-regressions of the
probability for a takeover deal to be structured as a tender offer on indicators for solicited deals, contested deals, and
prior relationship between the acquirer and the target; an indicator for high-debt acquirers (debt-to-asset ratio
exceeding the industry median); and indicators for a second request for information on the deal from the Department
of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission; deal relative value; an indicator for cash deals; and additional target
and acquirer controls. Robust P-values are reported in parentheses. The sample period is 2007-2010. The last two
rows report the total number of observations and adjusted R-squared in each regression. (***), (**), and (*) indicate
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.

Probit

Probit

OLS

OLS

-0.198

-0.187

-0.143

-0.134

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.005)***

(0.014)**

0.178

0.168

0.174

0.176

(0.003)***

(0.000)***

(0.009)***

(0.011)**

0.115

0.117

0.134

0.137

(0.121)

(0.064)*

(0.087)*

(0.083)*

Legal/Financial Impediments to Tenders
Acquirer's High Debt dummy
-0.303
-0.3

-0.086

-0.057

Competition for Target
Solicited
Competitive Bidder dummy
Prior Relationship dummy

Second Request dummy
Relative Value
All Cash dummy
Financials
Acquirer EBITDA/Assets
Acquirer Market/Book
Target Ln(Sales)
Target Debt/Assets
Target Market/Book
Constant

(0.006)***

(0.011)**

(0.229)

(0.491)

-0.342

-0.306

-0.184

-0.19

(0.003)***

(0.001)***

(0.004)***

(0.006)***

0.195

0.144

0.067

0.002

(0.362)

(0.252)

(0.666)

(0.992)

0.47

0.451

0.395

0.368

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

(0.000)***

1.022

0.798

0.43

0.522

(0.061)*

(0.103)

(0.002)***

(0.000)***

0.069

0.066

0.042

0.042

(0.044)**

(0.108)

(0.205)

(0.234)

-0.026

-0.014

-0.018

-0.006

(0.137)

(0.333)

(0.228)

(0.712)

0.248

0.293

0.202

0.195

(0.144)

(0.029)**

(0.089)*

(0.095)*

0.038

0.02

0.027

0.011

(0.044)**

(0.077)*

(0.047)**

(0.428)

-0.25

-0.759

0.26

-0.127

(0.435)

(0.013)**

(0.344)

(0.743)

Industry Fixed-Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

Year Fixed-Effects

No

Yes

No

Yes

296
0.340

296
0.403

296
0.319

296
0.358

Observations
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared
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Table 4
Takeover premium and acquisition method
The table estimates a two-stage least squares regression of the effect of the acquisition method on the acquisition
premium (four-week premium and market model premium). The endogenous variable is an indicator variable for a
tender offer and is instrumented with dummies for Solicited Bid, Prior Relationship, Acquirer’s High Debt, and
Second Request, as well as the Relative Value ratio of the deal and target and bidder characteristics. The dependent
variables at the second stage include the tender offer indicator (instrumented) and the target and bidder
characteristics. The third and the fourth models also include industry- and year-fixed effects. The table presents
coefficient estimates and standard errors from the second stage of the two-stage least squares estimation. The sample
period is 2007-2010. The last three rows report the minimum eigenvalue F-statistic of the instruments at the first
stage, the root MSE, and the number of observations used in estimation. (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.
Four-week
p remium

Tender (Instrumented)
Competitive Bidder dummy
All Cash dummy
Acquirer Ln(Sales)

T wo-month
p remium

Four-week
p remium

T wo-month
p remium

0.288

0.448

0.2

0.275

(0.085)*

(0.033)**

(0.061)*

(0.053)*

0.054

0.13

0.075

0.155

(0.357)

(0.044)**

-0.156

-0.173

-0.139

-0.107

(0.022)**

(0.053)*

(0.011)**

(0.110)

0.055

0.038

0.055

0.032

(0.082)* (0.000)***

(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)***

Acquirer EBITDA/Assets
Acquirer Market/Book
Target Ln(Sales)

0.517

0.566

0.735

1.016

(0.213)

(0.304)

(0.054)*

(0.095)*

0.009

0.034

0.005

0.035

(0.770)

(0.391)

(0.816)

(0.306)

-0.076

-0.043

-0.069

-0.03

(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)***

Target Debt/Assets

0.418
(0.014)**

Target Market/Book

-0.048

0.149

0.409

0.113

(0.367) (0.003)***

(0.209)

-0.055

-0.037

-0.037

(0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)***

Target EBITDA/Assets
Constant
Industry Fixed-Effects
Year Fixed-Effects
Observations
F-Stat of instrument @ 1st stage

-0.066

-0.153

0.014

-0.078

(0.661)

(0.128)

(0.938)

(0.573)

0.696

0.407

0.294

0.01

(0.060)*

(0.047)**

(0.421)

(0.958)

No
No
291
6.42 ***

No
No
288
6.89 ***

Yes
Yes
291
6.37 ***

Yes
Yes
288
5.61 ***
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Table 5
Returns to rival firms at acquisition announcements
The table compares announcement-period returns for the acquirer's rivals in mergers and tender offers in the SDC
data for the period from 2007 through 2010. The market-model is used to calculate cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) with a value-weighted index over the windows from [-2,2] and [-1,1] centered around the announcement
date. Rivals are defined as firms in the same four-digit SIC industry with a ratio of acquirer assets-to-rival assets in
the range from 0.25 to 4.0.

Panel A: Comparison of Means
Deal Type
Merger
Tender Offer
Difference
p-value for difference

CAR [-2,2]
0.63%
-0.60%
-1.23%
0.0155

CAR [-1,1]
0.59%
-0.12%
-0.71%
0.0721

n
167
70

CAR [-1,1]
0.21%
-0.17%
-0.38%
0.070

n
167
70

Panel B: Comparison of Medians
Deal Type
Merger
Tender Offer
Difference
p-value for difference

CAR [-2,2]
0.28%
-0.47%
-0.75%
0.070

5

25.0%

20.0%

15.0%

10.0%

5.0%

0.0%

Figure 1 Proportion of tender offers by year
The table reports the total number deals, number of tender offers, and the proportion of tender offers relative to total
number of deals for publicly-traded targets in the SDC data for each year over the 1995-2010 period. Acquirers in
these deals are publicly-traded firms that held less than 10% of the target before the acquisition and more than 90%
after. The minimum deal size is US$1 million.
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